Cooperation, Coordination and Competition: The Mechanics of Formalizing Inter-Municipal Agreements in Canada

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## **Strategies for Linking Regions**

Policy-makers have a number of options at their disposal:

- Single-Tier
- Two-Tier
- Special Purpose Districts
- Inter-Municipal Cooperation



## **Presentation Outline**

- Tools for Inter-Local Cooperation
- Incentives and Motivation for Inter-Local Cooperation
- Necessary Conditions for Inter-Local Cooperation
- Transaction Costs
- Agreement Types
- Study of 6 Metropolitan Areas
- Examination of Intensity Measures
- Accountability and Transparency
- Provincial Role



## The Tools of Inter-Local Cooperation

## Easiest

- Informal Cooperation
- Inter-Local Service Agreements
- Joint Powers Agreements
- Contracting

## Middling

- Extraterritorial Powers
- Planning and Development Districts
- Local Special Districts

## Hardest

• Annexation

 Consolidation and Restructuring





### **Motivation and Incentives**





## Conditions for Effective Inter-Local Cooperation

Capacity	Willingness
Resources, institutions, Leadership	Needs, Desires, Benefits, Incentives
How constrained are leaders? How constrained are institutions? How significant is the commitment? What is the term of the commitment? Multi-level involvement? Multi-level influence? Can partners fulfill terms?	Is there a need to cooperate? Are there political benefits? Are there fiscal benefits? Is there a history of cooperation? Is there consistent communication? Are the transaction costs high/low? Is there community support?



### **Transaction Costs and Inter-Local Agreements**

Transaction Cost	Description
Information and Coordination Costs	Information on the preferences of all participants over possible outcomes and their resources must be common knowledge
Negotiation/Division Costs	The parties must be able to agree on a division of their mutual gains
Enforcement/Monitoring Costs	There can be at most low costs associated with monitoring and enforcing the agreement
Agency Costs	The bargaining agents must well represent the interests of their constituents





## **Types of Agreements**

Adaptive Agreements	Restrictive Agreements
Memoranda of Understanding Mutual Aid Agreements Informal Agreements	Contracts Special Authority Agreements
Lower/Easier	Higher/Harder



## **Study Structure**

Six Canadian Metropolitan Areas


- Toronto (Ontario)
- Calgary (Alberta)
- Edmonton (Alberta)
- Winnipeg (Manitoba)
- Regina (Saskatchewan)
- Saskatoon (Saskatchewan)

1995 → 2013




СМА	Gov. Units	Population	Land Area	Pop. Density	Agreements
Toronto	27	5,583,064	5,905.71	954.4	130
Winnipeg	10	730,018	5,303.09	137.7	15
Saskatoon	24	260,000	5,214.52	50.0	11
Regina	16	210,556	3,408.28	61.8	13
Edmonton	31	1,159,869	9,426.73	123.0	41
Calgary	9	1,214,839	5,107.88	237.9	13














Few Agreements

Average number of actors 3.15

Only 20% of the agreements are signed with a central city



#### **Mutual Aid CMA** Contract MOU Toronto Winnipeg Saskatoon





	Total	Percent
Agreements with Expiry Clauses	128	57.3%
Agreements with Termination Clauses	160	71.7%
Agreements Leading to the Creation of Joint Committees or Boards	11	4.9%
Agreements with Dispute Resolution Mechanisms	12	5.3%
Number Restrictive Agreements	170	76.2%
Number of Adaptive Agreements	53	23.7%



### WATER SUPPLY AGREEMENT This Agreement made in quadruplicate this 14 day Much, 2008 RETWIEN CITY OF TORONTO ("Toronto") - and-THE REGIONAL MUNICIPALITY OF YORK

APPROVED AS TO FORM

("York")

WHEREAS The Menicipality of Metropolitan (Invitabler referred to as "Metro") entered into an agreement, dated December 23, 1974, parsiant to the provisions of the Ontario Water Resources Act, with Her Majority the Qooss in Right of Optacio as represented by the Minister of the Environment (the "Covers") for the provision of water to York and, subsequently, by agreement, dated April 18, 1975, externel into a tripartile agreement with the Coven and York with respect thereto (the "Original Water Supply Agroements");

AND WHEREAS Merco and York participated in joint studies to identify capital improvements in Merey which would enable the delivery of additional water to York and participated in cost sharing of specific capital assprovements to date;

AND WHEREAS Toronto was incorporated on January 1, 1998 and, pursuant to the provisions of the City of Torseto Act, 1997, stands in the place of Metro for all purposes,

AND WHEREAS pursuant to the provisions of section 15 of the City of Toronto Act, 1997 Ola. 2) Toronto may enter into constructs for the supply of water to a regional municipality for its use or for resale to the inhabitants thereof.

AND WHEREAS pursuant to the Municipal Act 2007, York may enter into a contract for the purchase of water from Toronto;

AND WHEREAS in 1998 Turonio and York entered into a further agreement for the supply of additional water from Toronto to York upon the terms and conditions out out therein (the "1998 Agreement's

AND WHEREAS Toronto and York are desiroos of continuing the repply of water from Torists to York as father set our is this summaries

EXHIBIT A TO DYLAN NO. 1-2003 AGREEMENT DATED Betwom

THE CITY OF REGINA (the "City")

- and -

THE RURAL MUNICIPALITY OF LUMSDEN OF SASKATCHEWAN NO. 189 (he "R.M.")

#### FIRE SERVICES AGREEMENT

#### INTENT

The Parties runs this agroument purmant to section 33 of The Citles Act and section 214.1 1.1 of The Recal Manicipality Act, 1989, with the intention of the Parties to provide in all respects for the terms and conditions upon which fire-fighting rod related emergency acryices muy be provided by the City to the R.M.

12 This Agreement replaces a prior agreement by the Parties dated July 30, 1992.

#### DEFINITIONS

2.1 In this Agroundent:

"Alarm" means any call to the RFD or any call routed to the RFD in connection with any Emergency or request for Pice Services;

"Emergency" news wry situation to which the RFD would normally respond, excluding first-response medical services;

"Fire Services" means all those services typically provided by the RFD in emposes to Alarms, including fire suppression, macue, and hazardous materials responses, but excluding first-response randical services;

"Viry Service Area" month that cortico of the generathic area of the R.M. shown






## **Agreement Intensity Measures**


Scale	Measures	Description
Cooperative	Timing	Duration of Partnership
	Binding	Dimension of Institutionalization Exhibited
	Integration	Distance from Regular Decision-Making
Fiscal	Exchange	Degree of Resources Sharing/Payment
	Risk	Amount of Risk Mitigation and Insulation
Policy	Mandatory	Centralized Mandate for Delivery
	Necessary	Basic Level Municipal Function
	Optional	Unnecessary for Basic Functioning













## A Note on Accountability and Transparency

- Agreements are not publicly accessible
- Many agreements are redacted
- Not available in a timely manner
- Problems with count and content accuracy
- Little public knowledge of agreements or contents
- Low public involvement
- Low organizational knowledge



## The Role of the Province

Part of the reason we see so few agreements is provincial control and approval of boundary expansions

"[inter-local agreements] can be time-consuming to negotiate, can foster dispute, and can create confusion about accountability...further, these agreements create uncertainty about lines of policy-making responsibility"

- Government of Ontario (Patterns for the Future, 1987)



## Conclusion

- -Very few agreements
- -Mostly for emergency protection
- -Little cooperation on large capital projects
- -Low-to-mid range intensity
- -Remarkable consistency in intensity levels across the country
- -Large provincial role
- -Low accountability and transparency

