Cooperation, Coordination and Competition: The Mechanics of Formalizing Inter-Municipal Agreements in Canada

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Strategies for Linking Regions

Policy-makers have a number of options at their disposal:

- Single-Tier
- Two-Tier
- Special Purpose Districts
- Inter-Municipal Cooperation



Presentation Outline

- Tools for Inter-Local Cooperation
- Incentives and Motivation for Inter-Local Cooperation
- Necessary Conditions for Inter-Local Cooperation
- Transaction Costs
- Agreement Types
- Study of 6 Metropolitan Areas
- Examination of Intensity Measures
- Accountability and Transparency
- Provincial Role



The Tools of Inter-Local Cooperation

Easiest

- Informal Cooperation
- Inter-Local Service Agreements
- Joint Powers Agreements
- Contracting

Middling

- Extraterritorial Powers
- Planning and Development Districts
- Local Special Districts

Hardest

• Annexation

 Consolidation and Restructuring





Motivation and Incentives





Conditions for Effective Inter-Local Cooperation

| Capacity | Willingness |
|---|--|
| Resources, institutions, Leadership | Needs, Desires, Benefits, Incentives |
| How constrained are leaders? How constrained are institutions? How significant is the commitment? What is the term of the commitment? Multi-level involvement? Multi-level influence? Can partners fulfill terms? | Is there a need to cooperate? Are there political benefits? Are there fiscal benefits? Is there a history of cooperation? Is there consistent communication? Are the transaction costs high/low? Is there community support? |



Transaction Costs and Inter-Local Agreements

| Transaction Cost | Description |
|------------------------------------|---|
| Information and Coordination Costs | Information on the preferences of all participants over possible outcomes and their resources must be common knowledge |
| Negotiation/Division Costs | The parties must be able to agree on a division of their mutual gains |
| Enforcement/Monitoring Costs | There can be at most low costs associated with monitoring and enforcing the agreement |
| Agency Costs | The bargaining agents must well represent the interests of their constituents |





Types of Agreements

| Adaptive Agreements | Restrictive Agreements |
|--|---|
| Memoranda of Understanding Mutual Aid Agreements Informal Agreements | Contracts Special Authority Agreements |
| Lower/Easier | Higher/Harder |



Study Structure

Six Canadian Metropolitan Areas


- Toronto (Ontario)
- Calgary (Alberta)
- Edmonton (Alberta)
- Winnipeg (Manitoba)
- Regina (Saskatchewan)
- Saskatoon (Saskatchewan)

1995 → 2013




| СМА | Gov. Units | Population | Land Area | Pop. Density | Agreements |
|-----------|------------|------------|-----------|--------------|------------|
| Toronto | 27 | 5,583,064 | 5,905.71 | 954.4 | 130 |
| Winnipeg | 10 | 730,018 | 5,303.09 | 137.7 | 15 |
| Saskatoon | 24 | 260,000 | 5,214.52 | 50.0 | 11 |
| Regina | 16 | 210,556 | 3,408.28 | 61.8 | 13 |
| Edmonton | 31 | 1,159,869 | 9,426.73 | 123.0 | 41 |
| Calgary | 9 | 1,214,839 | 5,107.88 | 237.9 | 13 |














Few Agreements

Average number of actors 3.15

Only 20% of the agreements are signed with a central city



Mutual Aid CMA Contract MOU Toronto Winnipeg Saskatoon





| | Total | Percent |
|---|-------|---------|
| Agreements with Expiry Clauses | 128 | 57.3% |
| Agreements with Termination Clauses | 160 | 71.7% |
| Agreements Leading to the Creation of Joint Committees or Boards | 11 | 4.9% |
| Agreements with Dispute Resolution Mechanisms | 12 | 5.3% |
| Number Restrictive Agreements | 170 | 76.2% |
| Number of Adaptive Agreements | 53 | 23.7% |



WATER SUPPLY AGREEMENT This Agreement made in quadruplicate this 14 day Much, 2008 RETWIEN CITY OF TORONTO ("Toronto") - and-THE REGIONAL MUNICIPALITY OF YORK

APPROVED AS TO FORM

("York")

WHEREAS The Menicipality of Metropolitan (Invitabler referred to as "Metro") entered into an agreement, dated December 23, 1974, parsiant to the provisions of the Ontario Water Resources Act, with Her Majority the Qooss in Right of Optacio as represented by the Minister of the Environment (the "Covers") for the provision of water to York and, subsequently, by agreement, dated April 18, 1975, externel into a tripartile agreement with the Coven and York with respect thereto (the "Original Water Supply Agroements");

AND WHEREAS Merco and York participated in joint studies to identify capital improvements in Merey which would enable the delivery of additional water to York and participated in cost sharing of specific capital assprovements to date;

AND WHEREAS Toronto was incorporated on January 1, 1998 and, pursuant to the provisions of the City of Torseto Act, 1997, stands in the place of Metro for all purposes,

AND WHEREAS pursuant to the provisions of section 15 of the City of Toronto Act, 1997 Ola. 2) Toronto may enter into constructs for the supply of water to a regional municipality for its use or for resale to the inhabitants thereof.

AND WHEREAS pursuant to the Municipal Act 2007, York may enter into a contract for the purchase of water from Toronto;

AND WHEREAS in 1998 Turonio and York entered into a further agreement for the supply of additional water from Toronto to York upon the terms and conditions out out therein (the "1998 Agreement's

AND WHEREAS Toronto and York are desiroos of continuing the repply of water from Torists to York as father set our is this summaries

EXHIBIT A TO DYLAN NO. 1-2003 AGREEMENT DATED Betwom

THE CITY OF REGINA (the "City")

- and -

THE RURAL MUNICIPALITY OF LUMSDEN OF SASKATCHEWAN NO. 189 (he "R.M.")

FIRE SERVICES AGREEMENT

INTENT

The Parties runs this agroument purmant to section 33 of The Citles Act and section 214.1 1.1 of The Recal Manicipality Act, 1989, with the intention of the Parties to provide in all respects for the terms and conditions upon which fire-fighting rod related emergency acryices muy be provided by the City to the R.M.

12 This Agreement replaces a prior agreement by the Parties dated July 30, 1992.

DEFINITIONS

2.1 In this Agroundent:

"Alarm" means any call to the RFD or any call routed to the RFD in connection with any Emergency or request for Pice Services;

"Emergency" news wry situation to which the RFD would normally respond, excluding first-response medical services;

"Fire Services" means all those services typically provided by the RFD in emposes to Alarms, including fire suppression, macue, and hazardous materials responses, but excluding first-response randical services;

"Viry Service Area" month that cortico of the generathic area of the R.M. shown






Agreement Intensity Measures


| Scale | Measures | Description |
|-------------|-------------|---|
| Cooperative | Timing | Duration of Partnership |
| | Binding | Dimension of Institutionalization Exhibited |
| | Integration | Distance from Regular Decision-Making |
| Fiscal | Exchange | Degree of Resources Sharing/Payment |
| | Risk | Amount of Risk Mitigation and Insulation |
| Policy | Mandatory | Centralized Mandate for Delivery |
| | Necessary | Basic Level Municipal Function |
| | Optional | Unnecessary for Basic Functioning |













A Note on Accountability and Transparency

- Agreements are not publicly accessible
- Many agreements are redacted
- Not available in a timely manner
- Problems with count and content accuracy
- Little public knowledge of agreements or contents
- Low public involvement
- Low organizational knowledge



The Role of the Province

Part of the reason we see so few agreements is provincial control and approval of boundary expansions

"[inter-local agreements] can be time-consuming to negotiate, can foster dispute, and can create confusion about accountability...further, these agreements create uncertainty about lines of policy-making responsibility"

- Government of Ontario (Patterns for the Future, 1987)



Conclusion

- -Very few agreements
- -Mostly for emergency protection
- -Little cooperation on large capital projects
- -Low-to-mid range intensity
- -Remarkable consistency in intensity levels across the country
- -Large provincial role
- -Low accountability and transparency

